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We have lived under the present Constitution of the United States
for over a century and a quarter. At the end of that long period of
time we are still disputing as to what legal effects must or will be
given in our states to the "public acts, records and judicial proceed-
ings" of other states. It is still to some extent uncertain when a judg-
ment duly rendered in one state will be recognized as constituting a
cause of action' in another state; it is still more uncertain whether
many causes of action recognized by the law of one state will also
be recognized as such by the law of other states. In short, the
'Like so many words and phrases in our legal vocabulary, "cause of action"
ig ambiguous. At times it is used to denote the group of operative facts to
which the law attaches legal consequences which enable the person with refer-
ence to whom the facts are true to obtain legal relief through a judicial
tribunal. As so used the phrase also connotes the legal relations which the
law attaches to such a group of facts. At other times, however, the phrase is
so used that it denotes the legal relations which result from the facts and
connotes that the facts are true of the one who is asserted to have the "cause
of action." Codes of civil procedure use the phrase in the former sense when
they require a plaintiff to "state the facts constituting his cause of action" in
plain and concise language. A common synonym of the phrase as used in the
latter sense is "right of action," in which case the word "right" is obviously
used in a generic sense and not in the specific sense as the correlative of
"duty." Throughout the present discussion an effort has been made by the
writer to use the phrase to denote the operative facts rather than the legal
relations resulting from them.
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"uniform interstate enforcement of vested rights," so forcefully
advocated by Mr. Justice Beach of the Connecticut Supreme Court in
a recent article in this magazine, is still remote from realization. That
the existing condition is desirable, it is believed no one will maintain.
Lawyers find it difficult to advise their clients. Litigants all too often
find they can not enforce their claims because the wrongdoer is immune
from suit in the jurisdiction where he has property subject to execu-
tion. To examine into the reasons for this legal anarchy which to a
large degree still governs the relations of our states to each other in
this respect, and to suggest a means of remedying the situation with-
out a federal constitutional amendment, is the object of the present dis-
cussion.
The portion of the Constitution of the United States which bears
most immediately upon the problem is the "full faith and credit
clause." It reads as follows:
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." 'R
Acting in pursuance of the powers thus vested in it, Congress in 1790
provided the mode in which these "public acts, records and judicial
proceedings" were to be authenticated, and prescribed their effect in
words wlhich have remained substantially unaltered. The present
statute reads:
"And the said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated,
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within
the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
State from which they are taken."2
Although the constitutional provision and the Act of Congress seem
reasonably plain of meaning at first sight, the slightest examination of
the decisions of the courts under them leaves one perplexed and
bewildered. What constitutes giving "full faith and credit" in one
state to a judgment of another state? To this day no clear answer
can be given. As late as 19o8 we find the United States Supreme
Court divided into the familiar five to four grouping in the leading
case of Fauntleroy v. Lum. 8 A recent case in Illinois seems to the
present writer identical in substance with Fauntleroy v. Lum, yet the
Illinois Supreme Court unanimously reached the opposite conclusion. 8a
,a Art. 4, Sec. i.
'U. S. Rev. St. sec. 9o5; U. S. Comp. Stat, 1g16, p. 2431.
' (i9o8) 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641.
"aKenny v. Supreme Lodge, etc., Loyal Order of Moose (igi8, Ill.) -2o
N. E. 631.
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In so deciding the Illinois court was fortified by the opinions, if not
by the decisions, in cases which were decided before Fauntleroy v.
Lum. In spite of all the doubt and confusion no attempt has been
made by Congress to "prescribe" more clearly the "effect" of state
judgments in other states; indeed it seems almost to be overlooked
that Congress has power to do so.
That Congress has the power to do far more than it has 'thus far
done seems clear, both from the words of the clause itself and from
the history of that clause in the convention which framed the present
Constitution. The clause is the lineal descendant of a somewhat
similar clause in the Articles of Confederation. That clause read:
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the
records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of
every other state."4
No such clause appeared in the "Virginia" plan for a new constitu-
tion submitted by Randolh to the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
As is well known, this plan formed the original basis upon which the
Convention worked. On the other hand, it seems clear that the
"Pinckney plan," offered by Charles Pinckney, contained a clause sub-
stantially identical with that in the Articles of Confederation.5 It is
also clear that this "Pinckney plan" was referred to the Committee
of Detail to whom the report of the Committee of the Whole was
referred for elaboration. 6 The first real appearance of the clause in
the Convention's work therefore is in the report of the Committee of
Detail. It there reads as follows:
"Article XVI."
"Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legisla-
tures, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and
Magistrates, of every other State."
7
An important change in phraseology from the reading of the clause
in the Articles of Confederation should be carefully noted, if we are to
grasp the full significance of the clause as it appears in the completed
Constitution. Under the Articles of Confederation full faith and
credit was to be given only to "the records, acts and judicial proceed-
ings of the courts and magistrates of every other State." The pro-
'Articles of Confederation, Art. 4.
'The "Pinckney Plan" as printed in Madison's Journal is clearly not the
plan actually submitted to the Convention. On the basis of all the available
evidence Professor Max Farrand has attempted to reconstruct the plan. As
so reconstructed it contains a full faith and credit clause. 3 Farrand, The
Records of the Federal Convention, Appendix D, 595-6o9.
°2 Farrand, op. cit., io6.
'Ibid. x88.
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vision as reported by the Committee of Detail requires full faith and
credit to be given, not only to these but also to "the acts of the
Legislatures" of other States. Note however that even yet the clause
does not purport to confer upon Congress any power to define by legis-
lation the meaning of "full faith and credit."
When the clause was taken up for discussion it was with other
clauses committed to a special committee for reconsideration. s During
the debate on the motion to commit the following remarks were made:
"Mr. Madison was for committing. . . . He wished the Legis-
lature might be authorized to provide for the execution of judgments
in other States, under such regulations as might be expedient. He
thought that this might be safely done, and was justified by the nature
of the Union.
"Mr. Randolph said there was no instance of one nation executing
judgments of the courts of another nation. He moved the following
proposition:
'Whenever the act of any state, whether legislative, executive, or
judiciary, shall be attested and exemplified under the seal thereof, such
attestation and exemplification shall be deemed in other States as full
proof of the existence of that act; and its operation shall be binding
in every other State, in all cases to which it may relate, and which are
within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the State wherein the said
act was done.' "9
Gouverneur Morris moved to commit also the following proposition on
the subject:
"Full faith ought to be given in each state to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the Legislature
shall by general laws, determine the proof and effect of such acts,
records, and proceedings."10
His motion was adopted. The origin of the provision giving Congress
power to prescribe the effect of state "acts, records and judicial pro-
ceedings" is therefore to be found in the suggestion of Madison and
the proposition of Gouverneur Morris.
When the clause next appears-in the report of the committee to
which it had been referred-it is obvious that the suggestions contained
in Madison's remarks and Morris' resolution have been acted upon,
for the clause now for the first time contains a provision giving Con-
gress powers of legislation. It reads as foilows:
Ibid. 448.
'Ibid. 448.
"Ibid. 448. The italics are those of the present writer. It seems obvious
that the term "public acts" in Morris's motion is meant to cover public legis-
lative acts.
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"Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the
Legislature shall, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such
acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect which
judgments obtained in one State shall have in another."'"
As the words in italics show, the power of Congress as the clause
then stood would not extend to prescribing the effect in other states
of anything but State judgments, but did go that far. Apparently
this was intended to cover Madison's suggestion that Congress be given
power to provide for the execution of judgments in other states.
Appai:ently also Morris' btoader proposition had not met with the
Committee's approval. This did not satisfy Morris, for when the
clause was taken up for action the following occurred:
"Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to amend the report concerning the
respect to be paid to acts, records, &c., of one State in other States by
striking out, 'judgments obtained in one State shall have in another';
and to insert the word 'thereof' after the word 'effect.'
Col. Mason favored the motion, particularly if the 'effect' was to
be restrained to judgments and judicial proceedings.
Mr. Wilson remarked, that if the Legislature were not allowed to
declare the effect the provision would amount to nothing more than
what now takes place among all independent nations.
Doctor Johnson thought that the amendment, as worded, would
authorize the General Legislature to declare the effect of the Legisla-
tive acts of one State in another State.
Mr. Randolph considered it as strengthening the general objection
against the pJan, that its definition of the powers of the Government
was so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers.
He was for not going farther than the Report, which enables the Legis-
lature to provide for the effect of judgments."12
In spite of Randolph's criticism, Morris' motion was carried, as well
as a motion to substitute may for shall between the words "Legislature"
and "by general laws," and the clause substantially as we now have
it was adopted:
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legis-
lature may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts,
records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."'8
What does all this show? Simply that the language of the clause
was intended by its framers to give Congress the power "by general
laws" to "prescribe the effect," i. e., the legal effects or consequences,
in other states of the "public acts, records and judicial proceedings"




of a state-including, therefore, legislative acts as well as judgments
and all other records and judicial proceedings. It is obvious, that
down to the present time Congress has hardly begun to exercise the
powers of legislation thus conferred upon it. It has attempted to pre-
scribe the effect of records and judicial proceedings only, and as to
those has contented itself with repeating the language of the consti-
tution about "full faith and credit"-language the meaning of which
we are still litigating at the end of one hundred and thirty years. Our
problem is to determine the extent of the powers of legislation given to
Congress but which have been only partially exercised.
Before doing so the writer wishes to direct attention to the method
of regulating the same matters in Australia, a country which also has
a federal system-modelled in many respects upon our own-but
whose constitution was framed at a much later date. As is well
known to students of Australian constitutional history, the members
of their constitutional conventions made a careful study of our experi-
ences under our Constitution. When framing provisions similar to
ours they therefore sought to clear up ambiguities of expression and
also to fill in omissions. The result of this study is shown in the fol-
lowing provisions of their constitution:
"Sec. 51. The Parliament shall have power to make laws with
respect to: (xxiv) The service and execution throughout the Com-
monwealth of the civil and criminal process and the judgments of the
courts of the States; (xxv) The recognition of the laws, the public
Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of the States."
"Sec. 118. Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the
Commonwealth, to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the
judicial proceedings of every State."
Note that instead of granting legislative power in general terms
they have been explicit as to what their federal legislature may do by
way of prescribing the effect in other states of judgments, other
judicial proceedings, etc., of a state. In pursuance of the clear power
thus granted, the Commonwealth Parliament at its very first session
enacted the "Service and Execution of Process Act, i9oi,"1
4 amended
and brought down to date in 1912 and known as the "Service and
Execution of Process Act, I9OI-I9I2."'1r The substance of this legis-
lation 8 is as follows:
i. The civil and criminal process of each State can be served
throughout the Commonwealth.17 In the case of civil process, if the
defendant does not appear, and it is made to appear to the court from
"4I Commonwealth Acts, 175.
' II Commonwealth Acts, 291.
"The complete text is given in Appendix B to this article, p. 441, infra.
" Service and Execution of Process Act, igoi-I912, sec. 4 (1).
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
which the writ issued, or to a jtdge thereof, that the writ was person-
ally served, or that reasonable efforts were made to effect personal
service on the defendant and that it came to his knowledge, the court
may, on the application of the plaintiff, order that the plaintiff shall be
at liberty to proceed in the suit, provided it falls within certain
enumerated classes.18 Obviously it would not be fair to permit a
plaintiff to try any suit whatever in any court from which he chose to
obtain a writ of summons. The statute therefore enumerates the
classes of actions in which it seemed to the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment fair to allow him to compel even a non-resident of the state to
submit to the jurisdiction of the court.
A discussion of the provisions as to the service of the criminal proc-
ess of the states throughout the Commonwealth is not within the
scope of the present article. They obviously take the place of our
somewhat cumbersome and ineffective "interstate rendition" and are
much more simple as well as more comprehensive.19
2. A judgment duly rendered in one State may be enforced in other
States without suing on it and obtaining a new judgment. .This method
of enforcing foreign judgments is well known to civil law countries.
The statute provides a simple method for registration of the judgment
with courts of similar jurisdiction in other states in which execution is
desired.2  After such registration the judgment has the force and
effect of a judgment of the court in which it is so registered. Due
provision is made to guard against abuses.21 The statute provides for
'Ibid. sec. ir (i). As the text of the Act is given in the appendix, an
enumeration of these classes is omitted here. The provisions of the act in
this respect are worthy of careful study.
"The inability of our states to obtain interstate rendition of fugitive crim-
inals if the governoV of the state in which a criminal is refuses to surrender
him is apparently not due to any lack of constitutional power to legislate on
the part of Congress, but simply to the fact that the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Act of Congress, which says that the surrendering shall be done
by the "executive authority" of the state, as "declaratbry" and not "man-
datory." Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison (i86o) 24 How. 66. The
Supreme Court in the case cited did indeed seem to take the view that Con-
gress could not make it mandatory upon the chief executive of a state to
surrender fugitive criminals. Even if, for the sake of argument, this be
admitted, there is a way out of the difficulty, for there seems to be no con-
stitutional objection to an Act of Congress vesting the power to surrender
fugitive criminals in the federal judicial officers. This was done in the case
of fugitive slaves by the Fugitive Slave Law of i85o. While the constitu-
tionality of that was attacked, it was finally acquiesced in. The provision for
the rendition of escaped slaves and that for the surrender of fugitive criminals
use the same language-that the person in question "shall be delivered up"-
but do not say by whom. It therefore seems to rest with Congress to enact an
enforcible interstate rendition law, if it so wishes.
" Service and Execution of Process Act, igoi-i92, secs. 2o and 21 (i).
'1 Ibid. sec. 21 (2).
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the registration not only of judgments for money but also for those
which either order or forbid the doing of acts.
In accordance with Australian ideas concerning the functions of
courts a power to make rules of court to carry into effect the pro-
visions of the statute, both as to the service of process and the enforce-
ment of judgments, is vested in the Supreme Court of each state, or
such of the judges as may make rules of court in other cases. We in
the United States are not so accustomed as are the Australians to con-
fer upon our courts a rule-making power, but the plan seems to be
growing in favor. It is obvious that a power of this kind leaves it
open to the highest court in each state to modify the procedural details
of the law from time to time as experience demonstrates a necessity for
so doing, and thereby gives to the system a flexibility which otherwise
it would not possess.
This system has been in force in Australia since I9OI and seems to
have proved satisfactory, for, as previously stated, it was re-enacted
with merely slight improvements in detail in 1912. It enables litigants
in Australia to enforce their legal rights throughout the Commonwealth
with a simplicity and directness unknown to our law.
Can the Congress of the United States without a federal constitu-
tional amendment establish a similar system if it should conclude that
such a course is desirable? It is the contention of the present writer
that to a large extent this can be done, if a reasonable interpretation
is given to the powers of legislation granted to Congress in the full
faith and credit clause. To get the problem concretely before us, let
us put a series of questions and then attempt to answer them.
If Congress deems it desirable to do so, has it the power to provide:
(i) for the service and execution throughout the United States of
the judicial process of the states?
(2) for the enforcement of state judgments throughout the United
States ?
(3) that a state judgment shall in other states constitute a cause of
action upon which suit may be brought and a new judgment obtained,
"anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary not-
withstanding"?
(4) that where a statute of one state declares that certain facts occur-
ring (in whole or in part) therein shall constitute a cause of action in
that state, the same facts shall be recognized in. each other state as
constituting a cause of action in such other state?
It may be noticed at this point that if questions (i) and (2) are
answered in the affirmative and Congress should adopt a law similar
to the Australian system, the answers to questions (3) and (4) would
become relatively unimportant. If, however, either the power to do
the things suggested under (i) and (2) be denied, or it is deemed
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undesirable by Congress to act in pursuance of those powers even if
recognized, then, as will perhaps appear more clearly later, the answers
to (3) and (4) become of great practical importance.
(i) Service in other states of state process in civil suits. Whether
Congress has power under the full faith and credit clause to provide
for the direct service in other states of either the civil or criminal proc-
ess of a state depends upon whether a law so providing would "pre-
scribe" the "effect" in other states of a state "judicial proceeding."
Is a writ of summons a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of
the constitution? It is at least a part of a judicial proceeding or a step
in one. It can not, of course, be known what the men who framed
the clause in question really had in mind; but after all that is not the
question, but rather the fair meaning of the words they did use. In
passing upon the question we must not overlook the words of Chief
Justice Marshall: "We must never forget that it is a constitution that
we are expounding. '22 We may also recall with profit the principle of
interpretation laid down by Chief Justice Winsiow of Wisconsin.
"When an eighteenth century constitution forms the charter of
liberty of a twentieth century government must its general provisions
be construed and interpreted by an eighteenth century mind in the
light of eighteenth century conditions and ideals? Clearly not . . .
Where there is no express command or prohibition, but only general.
language or policy to be considered, the conditions prevailing at the
time of its adoption must have their due weight; but the changed
social, economic and governmental conditions and ideals of the time,
as well as the problems which the changes have produced, must also
logically enter into the consideration, and become influential factors
in the settlement of problems of construction and interpretation.
'23
Can we not, taking into consideration present day needs, say that the
fair meaning, or a fair meaning, of the words used in the clause under
consideration includes a power in Congress to provide for the service
of state process throughout the states? If the constitutionality of
such a law be conceded, we still have to settle its desirability. It is
not intended at the present time to- discuss this phase of the --atter
exhaustively, or to urge legislation based upon the view that such a
power is vested in Congress. It is the hope of the writer to deal with
the matter, both in its constitutional aspects and as a matter of policy,
in a discussion to be published later. This much may, however, be
said. Our present rules prescribing the jurisdiction in which suit may
be brought against a wrongdoer are in many respects arbitrary. We
make it depend too much upon whether the defendant can be personally
'In McCullough v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 407.
'In Borgnis v. Falk Co. (1911) r47 Wis. 327, 347; 133 N. W. 209, 215.
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served in the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought. According to
the law in many states he can, for example, be served in the state
where he happens to be, even temporarily, if personal service is effected
in that state. This may result in trying the suit in a state in which no
part of the operative facts occurred and in which neither of the parties
lives. Even if it be tried in the state where the defendant resides, why
should a plaintiff, if he gives security for payment of costs, be required
to sue an alleged wrongdoer in a jurisdiction where no part of the
transaction took place? Is it not more rational to permit him to sue in
the jurisdiction where the contract in question was made or to be per-
formed, or in which the tort was committed? Granted that no state
can of its own volition make its process run beyond its borders-except
as to its own citizens-is it unreasonable that the United States should
by federal action be made a unit in the manner suggested? Surely the
state in which the operative facts, or some important portion of them,
occurred, is an appropriate jurisdiction in which to hear the litigation
arising out of them. However, in discussing the desirability of con-
ferring upon state judicial tribunals this broad jurisdiction we must not
forget the existence of the federal courts and the power of Congress
to extend very greatly their jurisdiction in cases involving diversity
of citizenship. Moreover, if state process were to be made to run
throughout the country, it would be only natural to adopt similar rules
to govern the service of the process of the federal courts.
(2) The direct enforcement of state judgments in other states.
From the history of the clause, as well as from its wording, it may be
said to be clear that under any fair interpretation of the grant of power
to Congress in the full faith and credit clause, that body can provide
for the enforcement of state judgments in other states, without the
wholly useless and unnecessary process of requiring a new suit on the
same and the obtaining of a new judgment upon which execution can
be had. To the mind of the present writer this seems a very obvious
way of "prescribing" the "effect" in other states of state judgments.
There can of course be no question that a state judgment is both a
[judicial] "record" and a "judicial proceeding." Under a properly
drawn statute, containing safeguards similar to those found in the
Australian statute, such a direct right to obtain execution in other
states furnishes a simple and expeditious method by means of which
a successful litigant may obtain satisfaction of his claim. That we
have so long clung to our more cumbersome system of requiring a new
suit merely shows the persistency with which we have adhered to com-
mon-law methods without inquiry into their reason for continued exist-
ence.
If the proposed law were adopted, it would be necessary to provide
that when the judgment of a court of one state is duly registered with
a court of similar jurisdiction in another state, the court in which regis-
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tration is effected, or the appropriate officer thereof, shall be under a
duty to issue execution. How could this duty be enforced if this
officer should refuse to issue the execution? Would the principle
involved in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennson,24 -to the effect
that the federal courts can not compel a state governor to render up
a fugitive criminal-be applicable? It is believed that it would not be.
The Supreme Court of the United States constantly reverses on writ
of error the action of the state courts, even the highest, where their
action is contrary to federal law. If the state court should refuse to
compel the officer in question to do his duty, and the highest state
court to which the question could be presented should affirm the lower
court's decision, clearly the question could be brought before the
United States Supreme Court on writ of error. It is inconceivable
that after the federal Supreme Court had once decided in favor of the
power of Congress, any state officer would refuse to issue the execu-
tion in a proper case. It seems, therefore, that one may conclude that,
so far as the second of our questions is concerned, all doubts may be
resolved in favor of the power of Congress to take the proposed step.
(3) .Compelling states to enforce judgments of other states by
rendering new judgments. If we were to provide for the direct
enforcement of state judgments in other states, there would be no need
for a law requiring the states" to recognize that a judgment of another
state creates a "debt of record" or similar obligation. If, however,
the proposition for direct enforcement of state judgments in other
jurisdictions be rejected as too great a departure from our existing
system-although why it should be so regarded the present writer
finds it difficult to conceive-or if, in spite of the arguments advanced
above, the constitutional power of Congress so to provide should be
denied, it would still be possible to perfect our present system by clear-
ing up the ambiguities inherent in the federal statute relating to full
faith and credit. As already stated, litigation is still going on to deter-
mine whether a state must permit suits upon duly rendered judgments
of other states. That a state may refuse to entertain such a suit is
still the view of many courts and writers. In the opinion of the
present writer the present statute ought to be so interpreted as to
require the states to enforce judgments of other states by rendering
new judgments, thus treating the original judgments as giving rise to
debts of record* or similar obligations. However, in view of the inter-
pretation given to the present federal statute by at least some state
courts it would be desirable-if the simple method of direct enforce-
ment is not adopted-to pass an unambiguous statute clearly making
such action mandatory upon the state courts. Of course Congress
could in many cases confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts, but
" (86o) 24 How. 66.
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there is no reason why the states should not be compelled to open their
courts, as was very clearly the intention of the framers of the Consti-
tution. A statute of the kind suggested should in substance provide
that a duly rendered judgment of one state must by all other states be
treated as constituting a cause of action upon which a new judgment
can be obtained.25 "Judgment" should be so defined as to include not
only judgments for money claims but also injunctions and decrees for
specific performance and the like. -Would this not be within the power
of Congress to prescribe the [legal] effect in other states of state
judgments? That it would seems the only reasonable interpretation
of the constitutional'provision. At the time of the adoption of the
Constitution it was the common law that foreign judgments duly ren-
dered had this effect. Was not the general power vested in Congress
to legislate on the matter intended to cover at least a power to make
the common-law rule compulsory upon the states, as well as to pre-
vent them in the suit on the judgment from going back of the duly
rendered judgment of the other state? If not, it is difficult to see
what power it was intended to give to Congress. In the opinion of the
present writer the direct enforcement of state judgments in other
states upon registration in the latter, as provided in the Australian
legislation, would be far simpler and better than requiring new suits
to be brought in other states upon such judgments. Nevertheless, to
make it clearly compulsory upon the states to render new judgments
in such suits would be far preferable to leaving the legal situation in
its present condition of uncertainty and doubt.
(4) Compulsory recognition by the states of rights created by
legislative acts of other states. Here we enter upon an unexplored
field. Down to the present time there seems to have been no discussion
of power of Congress to "prescribe" the "effect" [legal conse-
quences] in other states of state legislative acts. It is well settled that
under the present Act of Congress in regard to full faith and credit
no state is required to recognize as constituting causes of action groups
of facts so recognized by the law of other states, even though the
operative facts constituting these causes of action, or the more impor-
tant of them, occurred in these other states.26 The matter is left to
be regulated by each state, chiefly in accordance with the rules govern-
ing the Conflict of Laws, with resulting chaos and confusion, not to
'Judgments or decrees for divorce might require special provisions. The
present writdr believes that Congress has power under the clause we are
discussing to do much to dispel the confusion which still governs that portion
of our law.
"The Act of Congress passed in pursuance of the full faith and credit
clause attempts to prescribe the effect of judicial records and proceedings
only. The text of the Act is printed in the body of this article, supra, p. 422.
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say injustice.2 7  If Congress could and would provide in such cases
for service in other states of the process of the state where the trans-
action took place, no necessity would arise for legislation upon this
phase of the matter, for judgment could usually be obtained against
the wrongdoer in the state where the wrong was committed, and then,
under a law providing for the direct enforcement of the judgment in
other states, the plaintiff could without suit obtain relief in the state
where the wrongdoer had property subject to execution. In the
absence of such legislation, and confronted by doubts as to the con-
stitutionality of it-at least so far as provision for the interstate service
of state process is concerned-it is well worth while to inquire into the
powers of Congress with reference to the enactment of legislation to
make compulsory this "interstate enforcement of vested rights"
instead of leaving it, as now, to depend upon the whim of the state
legislature or the notions of the state court as to the Conflict of Laws.
A careful study of the evolution in the Constitutional Convention of
the wording of the full faith and credit clause will, it is believed, con-
vince the impartial student that the alteration in the language of the
clause to include acts of the state legislatures ("public acts"), and the
final shaping of the clause so as to give Congress power to prescribe
the effect not only of judgments but also of such public acts, was
intended by the more nationally-rhinded members of the Convention
to confer upon Congress some such power. True, we do not know
exactly what the members of the convention expected Congress to
enact in the way of legislation; but it seems obvious that they were
conscious that they were conferring in somewhat general language
power on Congress to deal with the matter. If a law of the kind
proposed would not "prescribe the effect" of state statutes in other
states, what kind of law would? It is difficult to see. If legislation
of this kind should at any time be undertaken it would be necessary,
in cases in which the operative facts occurred in more than one juris-
diction, to determine very carefully which jurisdiction should have
power to determine the legal consequences of such facts. It is con-
ceived that in place of the present chaotic condition which obtains in the
field of the Conflict of Laws as applied to interstate relations, Congress
"As in the cases where by judicial decision or explicit statutory provision
causes of action for wrongful death are refused recognition in states other
than the one in which the death was caused. The statute involved in Kenny
v. Supreme Lodge, etc., Loyal Order of Moose (i9i8, Ill.) i2o N. E. 631,
commented upon in (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 264, is an excellent example.
There are, however, certain decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which seem to point the way even under the present law toward requiring, our
states to give effect to statutes of other states. Supreme Council of the Royal
Arcanum v. Green (1915) 237 U. S. 53r, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, commented upon in
(1916) 25 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 324; Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber (i917)
38 Sup. Ct. 54.
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could by enacting such a statute substitute, at least to a large extent,
a code of uniform national law.27  The desirability of such a result
is obvious. As previously pointed out, however, the need for such a
system would be far less if state civil process in appropriate cases
could be served throughout the country. For that reason it is not
intended at the present time to press the point farther or to advocate
legislation of the kind suggested, as the writer hopes ultimately to see
provisions for the direct service in other states of state process in
appropriate cases.
As indicated above at several points, the present writer does not
advocate at the present moment an attempt by Congress to exercise all
the powers which a reasonable interpretation of the full faith and
credit clause might recognize as vested in that body. A first step
toward a simpler system than that which we now have for the inter-
state enforcement of "vested rights"-a step the constitutionality of
which seems reasonably clear-would be the passage of a federal law
providing for the direct enforcement in other states, or better in all
parts of our country, of judgments validly rendered in any part. To
be completely effective the proposed law ought to apply: (a) to all
state judgments; (b) to judgments of courts of the District of
Columbia and all other portions of the territory subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States; (c) to judgments of the federal courts
sitting within the states.2 8 Such judgments should be made capable
of registration in any portion of the territory subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, whether organized into states or not.29  The
constitutionality of such a law as applied to judgments of the federal
and territorial courts, including those of the District of Columbia, at
least so far as it provided for registration with federal courts in other
districts or portions of the country, is obvious. It also seems to be
well recognized that by virtue of the grant of judicial power in Article
III of the constitution and of the power to make all laws "necessary
and proper" to carry out the powers vested in the federal, Government,
Congress may by law require the state courts to give full faith and
credit to judgments of federal courts of all kinds.80
Any statute of this kind must of course make due provision to pro-
"a The limitation would be that Congress has power to prescribe the effect
of state statutes only, and not that of state "Fcommon law."
' Judgments of federal courts under our present system may not be
enforced by execution outside the state in which they are rendered.
"Some doubts may be raised as to whether the system ought to cover out-
lying territory-the Philippines, for example. So far as. the present writer
can see, however, there is no real reason for excluding them.
'Embry v. Palmer (1883) 107 U. S. 3, 2 Sup. Ct. 25; Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe R. v. Sowers (9o9) 213 U. S. 55, 29 Sup. Ct. 397; Hancock Bank
v. Farnum (igoo) 176 U. S. 64o, .2o Sup. Ct. 5o6.
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tect the defendant from abuse of the power so given. The Australian
statute has provisions intended to accomplish this purpose. The
holder of the judgment is required to file affidavits that the defendant
has not performed the duty imposed by the judgment.31 The court
in which registration is effected is given the same control and juris-
diction over the judgment as if the judgment were its own judgment,
and may on the application of the person against whom the judgment
runs order a stay of proceedings on such terms as to security, etc., as
may seem to it advisable.3 2 Due provision is made to secure the giving
of notice to the court whicli rendered the judgment and to all courts
with which it may have been registered, of all proceedings taken in any
court of registration.83 The judges of the highest court in each state
are also given a rule-making power to prescribe both details of practice
and procedure and the fees and costs which shall be paid.84
In an appendix 5 will be found a tentative draft of a law along the
lines proposed. This draft is offered merely as a suggestion of the
kind of statute which ought to be adopted. Criticisms and suggestions
will be welcomed by the author.
Can any real reason be given for continuing to follow the common-
law rule that before the judgment of another American-not foreign-
jurisdiction can be enforced, a new suit must be brought, with all the
attendant expense and delay? In any event the judgment of the sister
state is sued upon as a "debt of record," and the "record" is entitled
to "full faith and credit." To be sure, within limits it may be
attacked upon the ground that the court rendering it had no "juris-
diction" and that therefore it is not really a judgment, or for "fraud"
of certain kinds-but under the proposed system the same thing could
be done by suitable proceedings in the court of registration or by
other appropriate action. It is believed that the proposed law would
greatly simplify the enforcement of judgments throughout our country
and thereby lessen the expense to litigants and the demands upon- the
time of our overworked courts. Is it too much to hope that some
such simplification may in the near future commend itself to the good
sense of the legal profession?
"' Service and Execution of Process Act, i9oi-i9g2, sec. 23.
'Ibid. secs. 24 and 25.
" Ibid. sec. 26.
"Ibid. sec. 27.
.' See Appendix A, p. 436, infra.
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APPENDIX A
TENTATIVE DRAFT OF AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF
JUDGMENTS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES
An Act to provide for the Execution throughout the United States
of the Judgments of the Courts of Record of the States and of the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, and for other purposes connected therewith.
Be it enacted, etc., as follows:
PART I-PRELIMINARY
SECTION I-This Act may be cited as the Execution of judgments
Act, 19-, and is divided into parts as follows:
Part I-Preliminary
Part II-Enforcement of Judgments
Part III-Rules and Regulations
Schedule.
SECTION 2-(I) [A repealing clause, covering all laws incon-
sistent with the Act.]
(2) This repeal shall not affect any right, privilege,
obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any Act
so repealed, or affect any legal proceeding or remedy in respect of
any such right, privilege, obligation, or liability; and any such legal
proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if
this Act had not been passed.
SECTION 3-In this Act unless the contrary intention appears-
(a) "Suit" means any suit or action or original
proceeding between parties or in rem;
(b) "Court of Record" includes any court which
is required to keep a record of its pro-
ceedings;
(c) "Person" includes not only natural persons
but also the United States, or a State, or
any firm or corporation or other group of
persons treated by the law as capable of
suing or being sued;
(d) "Plaintiff" means any person seeking relief
in a suit against any other person;
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(e) "Defendant" means any person against
whom relief is sought in a suit or who is
required to attend the proceedings in an
action as a party thereto;
(f) "Judgment" includes any judgment, decree,
rule or order given or made by a Court
in any suit whereby any sum of money
is made payable, or the doing or not
doing of any act or thing other than the
payment of money is required.
PART II-ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
SECTION 4-Any person in whose favor a judgment is given
or made, whether before or after this Act takes effect, in a suit in
any Court of Record of any State, or any other Court of Record in
the United States or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, may obtain from the Clerk, or other proper officer, of
any such Court a certificate of -such judgment in the form and con-
taining the particulars set forth in the Schedule hereto or as near
thereto as the circumstances will permit, which certificate such officer
is-hereby authorized and required to grant under his hand and under
the seal of such Court, if there be a seal. Such certificate shall con-
tain a statement signed by the Judge, Chief Justice or Presiding
Justice of such Court, certifying to the correctness of the certificate.
SEC'rION 5-(1) Upon production of such certificate-
(a) to the Clerk, or other proper officer, of any
other Court of like jurisdiction in any
other State, or in any territory subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States; or
(b) if there is no Court of like jurisdiction in
such State or territory, then to the Clerk,
or other proper officer, of such Court as
may be designated by rules adopted by
the Judges of the highest Appellate Court
of such State or territory,
such officer shall forthwith register the same by entering the partic-
ulars thereof in a book kept by such officer and to be called "The
United States Register of Judgments."
(2) From the date of registration the certificate
shall be a record of the Court in which it is registered and shall, for
the purpose of the issuance of execution or other process for enforce-
ment, have the same force and effect as a judgment of that Court,
and the like proceedings for enforcement may be taken upon the
certificate as if the judgment had been a judgment of that Court, and
inierest shall be payable thereunder at the rate and from the date set
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out therein. Such certificate shall have the same faith .and credit in
the Court in which it is registered as the original judgment has by the
law or usage of the Court in which it was rendered.
(3) No certificate of a judgment shall be so registered
after a lapse of 12 months from the date of the judgment, unless
leave in that behalf has first been obtained from the Court in which
the certificate is proposed to be registered, or from a Judge thereof.
Proceedings to enforce a duly registered certificate shall be barred at
the time at which the enforcement of the original judgment is barred
by the law of the state in which it was rendered.
SECTION 6-(1) The Court in which any such certificate of a
judgment has been registered may, upon being satisfied that registra-
tion of the judgment was reasonably justified under the circumstances,
order that the plaintiff's costs of registration and other proceedings
under this Act, to an amount to be assessed by the Court or Judge,
but not exceeding the amount prescribed by the rules of Court here-
inafter provided for, be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.
(2) Any such order shall have the same effect as
though it were in the certificate.
SECTION 7-No execution shall be issued or other proceedings
taken upon such certificate unless an affidavit is first filed in the Court
out of which it is intended to issue such executidn or take such pro-
ceedings, made by the person in whose favor the judgment was given
or made by some other person cognizant of the facts of the case,
stating-
(a) that the amount for which execution is pro-
posed to be issued is actually due and
unpaid; or
(b) that an act ordered to be done remains
undone; or
(c) that the person ordered to forbear from
doing an act has disobeyed the order,
and no execution shall be issued for a larger amount than that
sworn to.
SECTION 8-The Court in which any such certificate of a judgment
has been registered and the Judges thereof shall, in respect of execu-
tion upon the certificate and the enforcement of the judgment, have
the same control and jurisdiction over the judgment as if the judg-
ment were a judgment of such Court.
SECTION 9-(I) The Court in which any such certificate of a
judgment has been registered or a Judge thereof may, on the applica-
tion of any person against whom the judgment has been given or
made, order a stay of proceedings on such certificate.
(2) Such order may be made on such terms as to
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giving security, or as to making application to the Court by which
the judgment was given or made, to set aside the same, or otherwise,
as to the Court or Judge may seem fit.
SECTION io-(i) When-
(a) any certificate of a judgment is registered
in any Court; or
(b) any execution is issued or other proceed-
ings are taken in any Court upon such
certificate; or
(c) satisfaction of the judgment either in whole
or in part is entered in any Court upon
any such certificate;
the Clerk or other proper officer of that Court shall forthwith notify
the same in writing under the seal of the Court to the Clerk or other
proper officer -of the Court in which the judgment was given or made.
(2) When any judgment whereof a certificate has
been registered in any Court has been satisfied in whole or in part,
the Clerk or other proper officer of the Court in which the judgment
was given or made shall forthwith, upon such satisfaction being made
or notified as the case may be, enter such satisfaction upon the judg-
ment and notify such satisfaction, in writing, under the seal of the
Court, to the Clerk or other proper officer of every other Court in
which a certificate of the judgment has been registered, and such satis-
faction shall thereupon be entered upon every such certificate.
PART M-RULES AND REGULATIONS
SECTION ii-(i) The Judges of the highest Appellate Court of
any jurisdiction in the Courts of which under the provisions of this Act
the certificate may be registered, or such of them as may make rules in
other cases, may make rules-
(a) prescribing the practice and procedure in
connection with the execution and
enforcement by such Courts of the judg-
ments of the Courts of other jurisdictions
whose judgments may be registered
under the provisions of this Act;
(b) prescribing the fees to be paid in connec-
tion with the registration and the execu-
tion and enforcement of such judgments,
and the costs to be allowed to any per-
son upon registering and enforcing any
such judgment, which fees and costs may
be recovered in the same manner as any
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APPENDIX B
THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICE AND EXECUTION OF PROCESS ACT, I90I-1912
An Act to provide for the Service and Execution throughout the Common-
wealth of the Civil and Criminal Process and the Judgments of the Courts
of the States and of other parts of the Commonwealth, and for other
purposes connected therewith.
Be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate and the
House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia, as follows:-
PART I.PELIMINARY.
I-This Act may be cited as the Service and Execution of Process Act igoi
and is divided into Parts as follows:-
Part I.-Preliminary, ss. x-3.
Part IL-Service of Process.
Service of Writs of Summons, ss. 4-13.
Service of other Process, ss. 14-16.
Proof of Service, s. 17.
Part III-Execution of Warrants, &c., ss. i8, ig.
Part IV.-Enforcement of Judgments, ss. 20-26.
Part V.-Rules and Regulations, ss. 27, 28.
Schedules.
2--(1) The Acts of the Federal Council of Australasia mentioned in the
First Schedule hereto, so far as the same may be in force in any State, are
hereby repealed.
(2) This repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liabilityacquired, accrued, or incurred under any Act so repealed, or affect any legal
proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, or
liability; and any such legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued,
or enforced as if this Act had not been passed.
3-In this Act unless the contrary attention appears-
(a) "Suit" means any suit, action or original proceeding between parties
or in rem;
(b) "Writ of summons" includes any writ or process by which a suit is
commenced or of which the object is to require the appearance of
any person against whom relief is sought in a suit or who is
interested in resisting such relief;
(c) "Court" includes any Judge or Justice of the Peace acting judicially;
(d) "Court of Record" includes any Court which is required to keep a
record of its proceedings;
(e) "Party" includes the Commonwealth or a State or any person
suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth or a State;,
(f) "Plaintiff" includes the King or any person suing on behalf of the
King and any party seeking relief in a suit against any other
party;
(g) "Defendant" includes any party against whom relief is sought in a
suit or who is required to attend the proceedings in an action as
a party thereto;
442 YALE LAW JOURNAL
(h) "Judgment" includes any judgment decree rule or order given or
made by a Court in any suit whereby any sum of money is made
payable or any person is required to do or not to do any act or
thing other than the payment of money.
PART Ir.-SERVICE OF PROCESS.
Service of Writs of Summons.
4-(1) A writ of summons issued out of or requiring the defendant to
appear at any Court of Record of a State or part of the Commonwealth may
be served on the defendant in any other State or part of the Commonwealth.
(2) Such service may, subject to any Rules of Court which may be made
under this Act, be effected in the same manner as if the writ were served on
the defendant in the State or part of the Commonwealth in which the writ was
issued.
5-(1) Every writ of summons for servicd under this Act out of the
State or part of the Commonwealth in which it was issued shall, in addition to
any other indorsement or notice required by the law of such State or part of
the Commonwealth, have indorsed thereon a notice to the following effect
(that is to say) -
"This summons [or as the case may be] is to be served out of the
State [or as the case may be] of and in the State [or as
the case may be] of 
"
(2) Every such writ of summons to which, by the law of such State or
part, an appearance is required to be entered, shall have endorsed thereon a
notice to the following effect (that is to say):-
"rYour appearance to this summons [or as the case may be] must give
an address at some place within five miles of the office of the
Court of at at which address proceedings
and notices for you may be left."
(3) Every writ of summons for service under this Act shall also contain
or have indorsed thereon or annexed thereto a short statement of the nature
of the claim made or the relief sought by the plaintiff in the suit, and if the
plaintiff sues in a representative capacity shall also state such capacity.
6-If a writ of summons or copy thereof does not bear all the indorsements
hereby required it shall be ineffective for service under this Act.
7-A writ of summons for service out of the State or part of the Common-
wealth in which it was issued may be issued as a concurrent writ with one
for service within such State or part of the Commonwealth and shall in that
case be marked as concurrent.
8-The time to be limited by the writ of summons for appearance being
entered or made by the defendant shall be such as may be prescribed by the
Rules of the Court out of which it is issued, but shall not be less than the
following, that is to say :-[Here follow special provisions for different por-
tions of the country.]
9-() Every appearance entered by or on behalf of a defendant to a writ
of summons served on him under this Act shall give an address at some place
within five miles of the office of the Court out of which the writ was issued,
at which address all proceedings and notices may be left for him.
(2) If such address is not given or is fictitious or illusory the appearance
may be set aside as irregular.
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io-Any defendant who has been served under this Act with a writ of sum-
mont may apply to the Court out of which the writ was issued, or a Judge
thereof, for an order compelling the plaintiff to give security for costs, and
upon such application the Court or Judge may make the order.
ii-(i) When no appearance is entered or made by a defendant to a writ
of summons served on him under this Act, if it is made to appear to the
Court from which the writ was issued or a Judge thereof-
(a) that the subject-matter of the suit, so far as it concerns such
defendant is-
(i) land or other property situate or being within the State
or part of the Commonwealth in which the writ was
issued; or
(2) shares or stock of a corporation or company having its
principal place of business within that State or part; or
(3) any deed, will, document, or thing affecting any such land,
shares, stock, or property; or
(b) that any contract in respect of which relief is sought in the suit
against such defendant by way of enforcing, rescinding, dissolving,
annulling, or otherwise affecting such contract, or by way of
recovering damages or other remedy against such defendant for
a breach thereof, was made or entered into within that State or
part; or
(c) that the relief sought against the defendant is in respect of a breach,
within that State or part, of a contract wherever made; or
(d) that any act or thing sought to be restrained or removed, or for
which damages are sought to be recovered, was done or is to be
done or is situate within that State or part; or
(e) that at the time when the liability sought to be enforced against
the defendant arose he was within that state or part; or
(f) that the domicile of the person against whom any relief is sought
in a matrimonial cause is within that State or part;
and if it is also made to appear to such Court or Judge-
(g) that the writ was personally served on the defendant; or in the
case of a corporation served on its principal officer or manager or
secretary within the State or part in which service is effected; or
(h) that reasonable efforts were made to effect personal service thereof
on the defendant, and that it came to his knowledge or in the
case of a corporation, that it came to the knowledge of such officer
as aforesaid (in which case it shall be deemed to have been
served on the defendant);
such Court or Judge may on the application of the plaintiff order from time to
time that the plaintiff shall be at liberty to proceed in the suit in such man-
ner and subject to such conditions as such Court or Judge may deem fit, and
thereupon the plaintiff may proceed in the suit against such defendant accord-
ingly.
(2) Any such order may be rescinded or set aside or amended on the
application of the defendant.
i2-When a judgment is given or made against a defendant who has been
served with a writ of summons under this Act, such judgment shall have the
same force and effect as if the writ had been served on the defendant in the
State or part of the Commonwealth in which the writ was issued.
i3-This Part of this Act does not confer on any Court jurisdiction to hear
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or determine any suit which it would not have jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine if the writ of summons had been served within the State or part of the
Commonwealth in which the writ was issued.
Service of other Process.
14-(1) When, in any suit in a Court of Record of a State or part of the
Commonwealth, any writ (other than a writ of summons) notice decree or
other process is required to be served on any party or person, such writ notice
decree or process may be served on such party or person in any other State or
part of the Commonwealth.
(2) Such service may, subject to any Rules of Court which may be
made under this Act, be effected in the same way, and shall have the same
force and effect, as if the service were effected in the State or part of the
Commonwealth in which the writ notice decree or process was issued.
(3) 'Thereupon all such proceedings may be taken as if the writ, notice,
decree, or process had been served in the State or part of the Commonwealth
in which it was issued.
15-(1) When a summons has been issued, on information upon oath, by
any Court or Judge or Police, Stipendiary, or Special Magistrate having juris-
diction in any State or part of a State or part of the Commonwealth, com-
manding any person-
(a) who is charged with any offence alleged to have been committed
in that State or part, whether the offence is indictable or punish-
able upon summary conviction; or
(b) against whom complaint is made, in that State or part, of his having
deserted his wife or child, or left his wife or child without means
of support,
to appear and answer the charge or complaint or be dealt with according to
law, the summons may be served on that person in any other State or part
of the Commonwealth.
(2) Such service may, subject to any Rules of Court or regulations
which may be made under this Act, be effected in the same way, and shall have
the same force and effect, as if the summons had been served in the State or
part of the Commonwealth in which it was issued.
(3) If such person fails to appear at the time and place mentioned
in such summons, and it appears to such Court, Judge, or Magistrate that the
summons was duly served on the defendant a, sufficient time before the day
appointed for the hearing, all such proceedings may be taken as if the summons
had been served in the State or part of the Commonwealth in which it was
issued.
i6-(i) When a subpcena or summons has been issued by any Court or
Judge, or Police, Stipendiary, or Special Magistrate in any State or part of
the Commorlwealth, requiring any person to appear and give evidence, or to
produce books or documents, in any civil or criminal, trial or proceeding, such
subpoena or summons may, upon proof that the testimony of such person or
the production of such books or documents is necessary in the interests of
justice by leave of such Court Judge or Magistrate on such terms as the
Court Judge or Magistrate may impose be served on such person in any other
State or part of the Commonwealth.
(2) If such person fails to attend at the time and place mentioned in
such subpoena or summons, such Court Judge or Magistrate, or any other
Police, Stipendiary, or Special Magistrate having jurisdiction in the State or
part of the State or part of the Commonwealth in which the subpoena or
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summons was issued may on proof that the subpoena or summons was duly
served on such person, and that a reasonable sum was tendered to him for
his expenses issue such warrant for the apprehension of such person as such
Court Judge or Magistrate might have issued if the subpoena or summons had
been served in the State or part of the Commonwealth in which it was issued.
(3) Such warrant may be executed in such other State or part of the
Commonwealth in the manner provided in this Act in the case of warrants
issued for the apprehension of persons charged with an offence.
Proof of Service.
x7-When any writ notice decree or other process has under the provisions
of this Act been served out of the State or part of the Commonwealth in
which it was issued such service may be proved-
(a) by affidavit sworn before any Justice of the Peace having juris-
diction in the State or part of the State or part of the Common-
wealth in which such service was effected, or before a Commis-
sioner for Affidavits or Declarations, or Notary Public for that
State or part; or
(b) in any manner in which such service might have been proved if it
had been effected within the State or part of the Commonwealth
in which the writ notice decree or process was issued.
PART III-EXECUTION OF WARRANTS, ETC. -
i8-(i) When a warrant has been issued by any Court or Judge or any
Justice of the Peace having jurisdiction in any State or part of a State or
part of the Commonwealth, for the apprehension or commitment of any
person-
(a) who is charged with any offence alleged to have been committed
within that State or part, whether the offence is indictable or
punishable upon summary conviction; or
(b) against whom an indictment for any such offense has been found
or presented; or
(c) against whom complaint has been made, in that State or part, of
his having deserted his wife or child or left his wife or child
without means of support; or
(d) who has failed to comply with an order made against him in that
State or part for the support or maintenance of his wife or
child; or
(e) who has disobeyed or failed to comply with an order made in that
State or part for the payment of money or for the doing of
some act; or
(f) who has failed to pay a fine inflicted by a Court of that State or
part,
any Justice of the Peace having jurisdiction in any other State or part of a
State or part of the Commonwealth, in or on his way to which that person is or
is supposed to be, may on being satisfied that the warrant was issued by that
Court or Judge (or in the case of a warrant issued by a Justice of the Peace,
upon proof on oath of the signature of the Justice) make an endorsement on
the warrant authorizing its execution within that other State or part.
(2) Such indorsement may be in the form or to the effect of the
Second Schedule hereto, and shall be sufficient authority to the person bringing
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the warrant, and also to all constables and persons to whom the warrant was
originally directed, and also to all constables or other peace officers in such
other State or part, to execute the warrant in such other State or part, and
to apprehend the person against whom the warrant was issued, and to bring
him before a Justice of the Peace having jurisdiction in the State or part of
the State or part of the Commonwealth in which the person was apprehended.
(3) Such Justice of the Peace may-
(a) Order the person to be returned to the State or part of the
Commonwealth in which the warrant was issued, and for
that purpose to be delivered into the custody of the person
bringing the warrant, or of the constables and persons to
whom the warrant was originally directed or any of them;
which order may be made by warrant under the hand of
such Justice of the Peace, and may be executed according
to its tenor; or
(b) admit the person to bail, on such recognisances as he thinks
fit, conditioned to appear at an appointed time and place in
the State or part of the Commonwealth in which the war-
rant was issued and answer the charge or complaint or
be dealt with according to law.
(4) Such Justice of the Peace shall for the purposes of this section
have the same power to remand the person and admit him to bail as he has
in the case of persons apprehended under warrants issued by him; and if it
be made to appear to him or to any Judge of the State that the charge is
of a trivial nature, or that the application for return has not been made in
good faith in the interests of justice, or that for any reason it would be unjust
or oppressive to return the person either at all or until the expiration of a
certain period, the Justice or Judge may discharge the person either absolutely
or on bail, or order that he shall be returned after the expiration of the
period named in the order, or may make such other order as he thinks just.
(5) Any Justice of the Peace, having jurisdiction in the State or part
in or on his way to which the person against whom the warrant was issued
is or is supposed to be, may, before the indorsement of the warrant, issue
a provisional warrant for the apprehension of that person, upon such informa-
tion and under such circumstances as in his opinion justify its issue; and
the provisional warrant may be executed accordingly:
Provided that a person arrested under a provisional warrant shall be dis-
charged unless the original warrant is produced and indorsed within a rea-
sonable time.
ip-(i) When a writ of attachment has been issued against any person
by a Court of Record of a State or a Judge thereof for a contempt of the
Court or disobedience of an order thereof, such writ may-
(a) by leave of a Justice of the High Court be executed in any
other State or part of the Commonwealth; or
(b) by leave of a Judge of the Supreme Court of any other State
be executed in such other State.
(2) Such leave shall be indorsed on the writ, and shall be sufficient
authority to the Marshal and also to the Sheriff of the State or part of a
State in which the writ was issued, and also to the Sheriff of the State or
part of a State in which the writ is to be executed, and to all other officers
named -in such indorsement, to apprehend such person and bring him before
the Court out of which such writ was issued.
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PART IV.-ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS.
2o--Any person in whose favor a judgment is given or made, whether before
or after the commencement of this Act, in a suit by any Court of Record of
any State or part of the Commonwealth, may obtain from the prothonotary
or registrar or other proper officer of such Court a certificate of such judg-
ment in the form and containing the particulars set forth in the Third
Schedule hereto or as near thereto as the circumstances will permit, which
certificate such officer is hereby required to grant under his hand and the
seal of such Court.
21-(1) Upon production of such certificate-
(a) to the prothonotary, registrar, or other proper officer of any
Court of like jurisdiction in any other State or part of the
Commonwealth; or
(b) if there is no Court of like jurisdiction in such other State
or part, to the registrar or other proper officer of a District
or County Court or other inferior Court of Record having
civil jurisdiction, in such State or part,
such officer shall forthwith-register the same by entering the particulars thereof
in a book to be kept by such officer and to be called "The Australian Register
of Judgments."
(2) From the date of registration the certificate shall be a record of
the Court in which it is registered, and shall have the same force and effect
in all respects as a judgment of that Court, and the like proceedings (including
proceedings in bankruptcy or insolvency) may be taken upon the certificate as
if the judgment had been a judgment of that Court, and interest shall be
payable thereunder at the rate and from the date set out therein.
(3) No certificate of a judgment shall be so registered after the lapse
of twelve months from the date of the judgment, unless leave in that behalf
has first been obtained from the Court in which the certificate is proposed
to be registered or from a Judge thereof.
22--For the purposes of the last preceding section any Court mentioned in
any of the following sub-sections shall be deemed to be a Court of like juris-
diction with any other Court mentioned in such sub-section namely :-[Here
follows an enumeration of various groups of courts.]
22 A-() The Court in which any such certificate of a judgment has been
registered may, upon being satisfied that the registration of the judgment was
reasonably justified under the circumstances order that the plaintiff's costs of
registration and other proceedings under this Act, to an amount to bh assessed
by the Court or Judge but not exceeding the amount prescribed, be paid by
the defendant to the plaintiff.
(2) Any such order shall be deemed to be incorporated with the cer-
tificate, and the amount payable thereunder to be payable under the certificate.
23-No execution shall be issued or other proceedings taken upon such cer-
tificate unless -an affidavit is first filed in the Court out of which it is intended
to issue such execution or take such proceedings made by the person in whose
favor the judgment was given or made by some other person cognisant of
the facts of the case, stating-
(a) that the amount for which execution is proposed to be issued
is actually due and unpaid; or
(b) that an act ordered to be done remains undone; or
(c) that the person ordered to forbear from doing an act has
disobeyed 'the order,
and no execution shall be issued for a larger amount than that sworn to.
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24-The Court in which any such certificate of a judgment has been registered
and the judges thereof shall, in respect of execution upon the certificate and
the enforcement of the judgment, have the same control and jurisdiction over
the judgment as if the judgment were a judgment of such Court.
25-(I) The Court in which any such certificate of a judgment has been
registered or a Judge thereof may, on the application of any person against
whom the judgment has been given or made, order a stay of proceedings on
such certificate.
(2) Such order may be made on such terms as to giving security, or
as to making application to the Court by which the judgment was given or
made, to set aside the same, or otherwise, as to the Court or Judge may
seem fit.
_-6-(I) When-
(a) Any certificate of a judgment is registered in any Court; or
(b) Any execution is issued or other proceedings are taken in
any Court upon any such certificate; or
(c) Satisfaction of the judgment either in whole or in part is
entered in any Court upon any such certificate;
the Registrar or other proper officer of that Court shall forthwith notify the
same in writing under the seal of the Court to the Registrar or other proper
officer of the Court in which the judgment was given or made.
(2) When any judgment whereof a certificate has been registered in
any Court has been satisfied in whole or in part, the Registrar or other proper
officer of the Court in which the judgment was given or made shall forthwith,
upon such satisfaction being made or notified as the case may be, enter such
satisfaction upon the judgment and notify such satisfaction, in writing, under
the seal of the Court, to the Registrar or other proper officer of every other
Court in which a certificate of the judgment has been registered, and such
satisfaction shall thereupon be entered upon every such certificate.
PART V-RULES AND REGULATIONS.
27-(i) The Judges of the Supreme Court of any State, or such of them
as may make rules of Court in other cases, may make rules-
(a) for prescribing the practice and procedure in connexion with
the service of the process of the Courts of such State under
this Act, and the execution ahd-enforcement by such Courts
of the process and judgments of the Courts of other States
and parts of the Commonwealth; and
(b) for prescribing the fees to be paid in connexion with the
service of the process of the Courts of such State under
this Act, and the execution and enforcement by such Courts
of the process and judgments of the Courts of other States
and parts of the Commonwealth, and the costs to be
allowed to any person upon enforcing any such judgment
(which fees and costs may be recovered in the same manner
as any money payable under the judgment).
(2) Until such rules have been made, and as far as any made do not
provide for the circumstances of any particular case, the practice and proce-
dure of the State in which the process is issued or in which the service is
effected or the execution is enforced respectively shall apply as far as
practicable.
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28-(1) The Governor-General may make regulations for carrying out the
provisions of this Act and in particular for further applying the provisions or
any of them to the service of the process of the Courts of the territories of
the Commonwealth, and for the execution and enforcement by such Courts
of the process and ju.dgments of the Courts of the States and of other parts
of the Commonwealth.
(2) All such regulations shall be notified in the Gazette, and shall
thereupon have the force of law.
(3) All such regulations shall be laid before both Houses of the Parlia-
ment within thirty days after the making thereof, if the Parliament be then
sitting, and if not then within thirty days after the meeting of the Parliament.
